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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Item 60 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 3 June 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the French arms control and disarmament plan recently put forward by the President of the French Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the text of this letter and the French arms control and disarmament plan to all the Members of the Organization as an official document of the forty-sixth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, under item 60 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Marc ROCHEREAU DE LA SABLIÈRE
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/46/50.

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READER
FICHE

ANNEX

Arms control and disarmament plan

The spread of increasingly costly and destructive weapons systems is engendering growing risks for the world. Inequality, injustice and disparities in power bring in their wake threats, the arms race, and conflicts of all kinds. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction gives a global dimension to this risk. The whole world, South and North alike, has a vital interest in halting this race and in checking this dangerous, ruinous proliferation. This is a matter which concerns us all.

Our aims are clear. Chemical weapons must be eliminated. Bacteriological weapons must not be produced. Existing nuclear arsenals must be reduced to their lowest level consistent with the maintenance of deterrence. Non-dissemination of nuclear weapons remains an imperative. Conversely, the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is justified. The dissemination of ballistic technologies must be strictly controlled in so far as they may be used for aggressive ends. On the other hand, there is no reason to prevent cooperation in space for civilian and scientific purposes.

With regard to so-called conventional weapons, the goal should be to safeguard or to institute a balance of power in each region at a level consistent with the right of all States to security. Arms exports must be strictly controlled and conducted in a manner compatible with this action. France has already endorsed these goals and stands ready to lend its support for any effort to improve existing arrangements, or for any new international or multilateral commitment based on them. It has already begun to give thought to this issue with its partners in the community.

Global arms control and disarmament requires action at three levels: with respect to each individual weapons category, and at the regional and world-wide levels.

I. Objectives regarding individual weapons categories

Each weapons category requires specific treatment, proceeding in stages if necessary. France is constantly concerned to adapt its own regulations, and in order to achieve clearly-defined goals applicable to all it proposes that practical measures be taken at an early opportunity, on a sector-by-sector basis:

1. A ban on, and elimination of, chemical weapons: The entire international community, meeting in Paris in January 1989, acknowledged the need to complete work as soon as possible on the convention banning chemical weapons. France has proposed the convening of a meeting of the Special Committee on Chemical Weapons in Geneva at ministerial level to conclude the talks before the end of the year. It calls on all States to become original parties to the convention.

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2. A ban on bacteriological weapons: at the Review Conference of the 1972 Global Prohibition Treaty, in September of this year, France will propose the addition of a protocol on verification.

3. Nuclear disarmament remains an essential goal. France supports the efforts of the two major Powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. It confirms that it will participate in the process as soon as the conditions laid down by it in 1983 have been fulfilled.

At the same time, it is important to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five existing nuclear Powers.

France, which already applies all of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has decided in principle to sign it and hopes that all States will accede to it.

4. The Missile Technology Control Regime, which enables those now in possession of missile know-how to limit the risks of ballistic proliferation, should be only an intermediate step towards a more general agreement - one that is geographically broader, better controlled and universally applicable. This agreement would lay down rules conducive to civilian cooperation in space, while eliminating any danger of diversion of technology for the purpose of developing a military ballistic capability. Here again, the aim should be to create a situation in which all States wishing to gain access to space for development purposes may cooperate within a framework that guarantees security.

France further recommends the development of confidence-building measures in space, in the form of a "code of conduct" for civilian and military satellites.

5. Conventional weapons. Conventional arms exports must not work against the region-by-region search for a balance of power at the lowest possible level consistent with each State's right to security.

The five permanent members of the Security Council - which happen to be the major producers of conventional weapons - are about to start a round of consultations in Paris in the coming weeks aimed at working out rules for restraint. The process could then be broadened at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, with a view to establishing an international arms sales register to be kept by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Particular attention will be paid in these discussions to sales of conventional weapons through parallel markets.

The members of the European Community have already begun consultations with a view to making proposals on this subject.

II. Regional goals

The example of Europe is encouraging. Europeans have graduated from cold war to peaceful coexistence, and now to cooperation within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They have adopted and applied security and confidence-building measures. They have signed the first conventional disarmament agreement. This experience cannot be transposed as such. But it does show that the arms race is not inevitable. This approach could serve as an inspiration for other initiatives in other regions.

We call for regional security arrangements based on the following rules:

(a) Only after a start has been made on solving conflicts can this process get under way and thus begin to build confidence.

(b) Adoption by parties concerned of regional security and confidence-building measures. Information is the prime condition of confidence. Transparency and confidence-building measures, i.e. mutual disclosure of capabilities and force strengths, and of movements of armed forces, reduces the sense of threat and paves the way for disarmament proper. This requires a framework (which could be a regional organization) and means of inspection (on-site and satellite). France would be willing to disclose information available to it to regional agencies responsible for ensuring transparency. It would favour the provision of such means of observation - particularly space-based ones - as may be available to Europe and the United Nations, to such regional agencies.

(c) Efforts must be made to move towards a balance of regional power, through national decisions and through negotiations. Arms export policies must not run counter to this goal. Once such an equilibrium has been achieved, its level should progressively be lowered through negotiations, with provision being made for means of control.

(d) Strict regional application of specific category regimes laid down for ABC weapons and ballistic missiles. It is for this reason that, at the initiative of France, United Nations Security Council resolution 687 on the cease-fire in the Gulf reiterated that the specific restrictions placed on Iraq in respect of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, together with ballistic missiles, formed part of a broader approach aimed at establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles together with a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This goal should be pursued in other parts of the world.

III.

The United Nations is now in a position to play to the full the role conferred upon it under its Charter. France considers that it is therefore incumbent on the Security Council to lend its backing to and, where necessary, harmonize such disarmament and non-proliferation policies. The Council should encourage the signature of agreements on individual categories of arms, together with regional and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. On the basis of the agreements reached, it could develop general rules and thus maintain a world-wide watch.

This presupposes that the members of the Security Council, and first and foremost its permanent members, will set an example in this regard.



Security Council

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3 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the massive destruction wrought by the United States and its allies on Iraq's civilian facilities and infrastructure in the course of their military operations, which lasted from the night of 16/17 January 1991 until 28 February 1991, clearly demonstrated the iniquitous character of the United States and its unlawful use of the cover of international legitimacy and Security Council resolutions in order to destroy an entire people.

Not content with the more than 90,000 tons of bombs which they dropped during over 100,000 air raids on Iraqi cities and installations, United States aircraft continued - even after the cessation of hostilities and on the pretext of conducting reconnaissance - to carry out intensive air activity in Iraqi airspace, to shoot down unarmed aircraft, to destroy tanks, to drop airborne troops onto roads inside Iraq and to intercept Iraqi helicopters which were performing civilian duties and carrying civilian officials, political figures and relief agency delegations inside Iraq because military operations had destroyed and cut most of the country's land transportation routes. The following are details of these acts of provocation:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Details</u>
9/10 May	One sortie flown by a two-aircraft formation: the formation flew over the northern sector of Iraq at a speed of 720 km/h, overflying Arbil and Dohuk for the purpose of observation and provocation
10/11 May	Three sorties flown by single aircraft at a speed of 720 km/h and at low altitude: the aircraft, which entered from Turkish territory, flew over Zakho, Amadiyah and Mosul for the purpose of observation and provocation

11/12 May Four sorties flown by two formations at a speed of 720 km/h and at low altitude: the aircraft, which entered from Turkish airspace, flew over Mosul, Dohuk and Zakho for the purpose of observation and provocation

12/13 May Six single sorties violating Iraqi airspace from Turkey, reaching a speed of 720 km/h at various altitudes: the aircraft flew over Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk for the purpose of observation and provocation

13/14 May Six sorties flown by three formations: activity centred over Zakho, Dohuk and Mosul for the purpose of observation and provocation

14/15 May Five sorties flown by two formations and one single aircraft: activity, which initiated in Turkey, centred over the northern part of Iraq for the purpose of reconnaissance and provocation

15/16 May Twelve sorties flown by five formations and two single aircraft: activity centred over Mosul, Dohuk and Zakho for the purpose of observation and provocation

16/17 May Three sorties flown by one two-aircraft formation and one single aircraft at a speed of 720 km/h: activity centred over the area north of Dohuk for the purpose of observation and provocation

19/20 May Five sorties flown by two two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of up to 720 km/h: activity centred over eastern and southern parts of Dohuk for the purpose of observation and provocation

20/21 May Three sorties flown by single aircraft at a speed of 720 km/h: activity centred over the areas north of Mosul and Dohuk for the purpose of observation and provocation

21/22 May Fourteen sorties flown by four dual formations and six single aircraft, all entering from Turkish airspace, at altitudes ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 metres and speeds of between 650 and 950 km/h: activity centred over Mosul, Dohuk and the area north of Arbil for the purpose of observation and provocation

22/23 May Forty-six sorties flown by 21 two-aircraft formations and four single aircraft at speeds ranging from 600 to 850 km/h and at both medium and low altitudes: activity centred over Mosul, Dohuk and Tall 'Afar, for the purpose of observation and provocation

- 23/24 May Twenty-three sorties flown by eight two-aircraft formations, one three-aircraft formation and three single aircraft at speeds ranging from 700 to 900 km/h and at medium altitudes: activity centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Tall 'Afar and the area east of Arbil for the purpose of observation and provocation
- 24/25 May Six sorties, all entering from Turkish airspace, at speeds ranging from 700 to 850 km/h and altitudes of between 5,000 and 6,000 metres: activity centred over Arbil and Rawandiz for the purpose of observation and provocation
- 26/27 May Nine sorties flown by four formations and one single aircraft, all entering from Turkish airspace, at altitudes of up to 4,000 metres and speeds ranging between 700 and 800 km/h: activity centred over Arbil, Dohuk, Mosul and Qayyarah for the purpose of observation and provocation
- 27/28 May Four sorties flown by two formations, all entering from Turkish airspace, at medium altitudes and speeds of up to 720 km/h: activity centred over Zakho, Arbil and the area north of Mosul for the purpose of observation and provocation
- 28/29 May Four sorties flown by one two-aircraft formation and two single aircraft at speeds ranging from 700 to 850 km/h and at low altitudes: activity centred over Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah and Zakho for the purpose of observation and provocation

In placing these facts before the Secretary-General of the United Nations, members of the Security Council and all the nations, peoples and organizations of the world, we hope that the world will appreciate the lengths to which America has gone in its excessive and unjustified use of force, thus violating Security Council resolutions, showing contempt for the feelings of Iraqi citizens and disturbing their tranquillity and security.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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S/22669
3 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that American aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

I

1. On 29/30 May 1991, American air activity inside Iraqi airspace amounted to 21 sorties flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft, at speeds ranging from 700 to 850 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes. Air activity centred over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk and Tall 'Afar, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

2. On 30/31 May 1991, American air activity amounted to 34 sorties flown by 16 formations and two single aircraft, at speeds ranging from 700 to 950 kilometres per hour and at both low and medium altitudes. Air activity centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Arbil and Zakho, for the purpose of reconnaissance and provocation.

II

1. On 31 May/1 June 1991, American air activity inside Iraqi airspace amounted to 23 sorties flown by 11 formations and one single aircraft, at speeds ranging from 600 to 850 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes. Air activity centred over Zakho, Amadiyah, Arbil, Dohuk and Mosul.

2. On 1/2 June 1991, American air activity inside Iraqi airspace amounted to 15 sorties flown by 7 formations and one single aircraft, at speeds ranging from 700 to 850 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes. Air activity centred over Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Mosul and Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/216
S/22670
5 June 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 4 June 1991 from the Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, and pursuant to our previous letters concerning Israel's continuing acts of aggression against Lebanon, the latest of which was submitted yesterday (document S/22666), I hereby inform you that Israel has once again launched a large-scale attack, less than 24 hours after its most recent assault.

Beginning at 0915 hours (local time) today, 4 June 1991, eight Israeli F-16 military aircraft conducted a two-hour raid on the villages of Bgosta, Kfarfalous and Majdelyoun, east of the city of Sidon. The heavy bombs which they dropped killed seven and injured 38 others, mostly civilians, including 12 schoolchildren between 4 and 5 years of age. The raid also caused widespread destruction of buildings and property in the region and was accompanied by intensive activity on the part of Israeli military troops and armour in the area of Kfarhoune, overlooking Sidon.

This fresh Israeli escalation follows a large-scale concentration of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon over the past two weeks and repeated daily attacks on villages adjacent to the Israeli-occupied area known as the "security zone". It confirms Israel's persistent policy of disturbing the security and political situation in Lebanon by any means at its disposal, with a view to preventing the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

* A/46/50.

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The Lebanese Government, which, having moved to collect weapons from the militias and made preparations for a broad deployment of the army in the south, is working to restore normality after the protracted tragedy undergone by the Lebanese people, has frequently warned of Israel's destructive intentions in Lebanon and the region. It has repeatedly urged that the Security Council, and particularly its permanent members, adopt a responsible position by putting an end to Israel's arrogance and flagrant contempt for international conventions and laws. It retains its right to call for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous situation arising from Israel's continued acts of aggression in southern Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22671
4 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters, the most recent being our letter No. 126 of 29 May 1991, I have the honour to inform you of further Iranian violations of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, as follows:

1. At 0500 hours on 1 June 1991, a group of between 30 and 40 persons proceeding from Iranian territory in vessels, one of which carried a 14.5-millimetre machine-gun, opened heavy fire from light weapons and launchers on Iraqi forward units in the southern-sector area of Ujayrdah.
2. On 1 June 1991, the Iranians fired three rounds in the direction of the Nasr al-Janubi control post in the southern sector of Iraq.
3. At 2030 hours on 2 June 1991, Iranian personnel at the Iranian post on the Ghuzil road (coordinates 621321) fired 10 rounds in the direction of Iraqi forward units in the southern sector.

These further violations, which join the list of Iran's previous repeated violations of the provisions of the cease-fire, constitute, without any doubt, an infringement of the sovereignty and security of Iraq.

The Government of my country stresses, as it has done on previous occasions, the full responsibility of the Iranian Government for the damage caused by these violations and for the future consequences thereof.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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S/22672
4 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PURSUANCE OF
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 696 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, the operative paragraphs of which read:

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1991 (S/22627) and the addendum dated 29 May 1991 (S/22627/Add.1) and the recommendations therein;

2. Decides accordingly to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) (henceforth UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect;

3. Further decides to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months from the date of adoption of this resolution in order to accomplish the objectives stated in the report of the Secretary-General (S/22627);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments.

2. The Secretary-General was present at the ceremony at which the Accords referred to in paragraph 2 of the above resolution were signed by the President of the People's Republic of Angola and the President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in Lisbon on 31 May 1991. The Secretary-General immediately took steps to implement the new mandate entrusted by the Security Council to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). Advance parties were deployed on 2 June 1991 to five of the six regional headquarters referred to in paragraph 15 (a) of S/22627.



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S/22673
5 June 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that American aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

1. American air activity inside Iraqi airspace on 2/3 June 1991 amounted to nine sorties flown by four formations and one single aircraft, at speeds ranging from 700 to 900 kilometres per hour and at both low and medium altitudes.
2. Air activity centred over Amadiyah and Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
